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HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES ADVANCE
REVERSE ACADEMIC DIVERSITY
L. Darnell Weeden*
INTRODUCTION
One commentator correctly recognizes that a new, transforma-
tive racial diversity role at historically black colleges and universi-
ties (“HBCUs”)1 may be the key to their own survival.2 More than
* Associate Dean and Roberson King Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of
Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. Special thanks to
Associate Professor, Asmara Tekle Johnson, my colleague at Thurgood Marshall for
her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I would like to thank my
Research Assistant, Lauren Beamon, J.D. Candidate 2010, Thurgood Marshall School
of Law, for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am grateful to
my wife and my children for their moral support while I worked on this article. In
addition, I am grateful to Professor Kevin Brown Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington for his helpful comments regarding this article as a work in progress
presentation at the Nineteenth Annual Midwestern People of Color (MWPOC) Legal
Scholarship Conference sponsored by the University of Iowa College of Law on May 8,
2009. On March 28, 2009, at the 2009 Southeast/Southwest People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conference (SE/SWPOC) hosted by the Phoenix School of Law, Phoe-
nix, Arizona, I discussed an earlier version of this article as a member of the panel on
Historically Black Law Schools and the Dialogue on Race.
1 The Higher Education Act of 1965 defines an HBCU as:
any historically black college or university that was established prior to
1964, whose principal mission was, and is, the education of Black Ameri-
cans, and that is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting
agency or association determined by the Secretary [of Education] to be
a reliable authority as to the quality of training offered or is, according
to such an agency or association, making reasonable progress toward
accreditation.
20 U.S.C. § 1061(2) (2006). HBCUs also serve an important role of awarding more
than 19% of bachelor’s degrees earned by African Americans; graduating 40% or
more of all African Americans who receive degrees in physics, chemistry, astronomy,
environmental sciences, mathematics and biology; and producing nearly 50% of the
African American public school teaching force. Many HBCUs specialize in teaching
students from disadvantaged backgrounds. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STRENGTHENING OUR
NATION’S HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (2009), http://www.ed.
gov/about/inits/list/whhbcu/strengthening-hbcus.pdf. See generally Alfreda A. Sellers
Diamond, Serving the Educational Interests of African-American Students at Brown Plus
Fifty: The Historically Black College or University and Affirmative Action Programs, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 1877, 1878–92 (2004).
2 Dr. Julius Chambers, the Chancellor of North Carolina Central University,
stated this conclusion in an interview:
[T]he integration of HBCUs is not only a question of fairness, but also a
critical survival tactic. HBCUs [must] prepare for a more diverse stu-
dent body because it’s in their long-term best interest . . . [More] of the
best Black students are attending White colleges. Any Black public col-
1
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seventeen years ago, the Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice3
held that HBCUs must also recruit non-black students in order to
dismantle de jure segregation; HBCUs today should embark on a
concerted effort to implement admissions policies to become “re-
verse diversity” institutions, where non-black students are en-
couraged to enroll. In the process, these non-traditional policies
will advance a new framework for diversity that challenges the
flawed “traditional diversity” paradigm that most predominantly
white institutions (“PWIs”) have followed since the Supreme Court
decided Grutter v. Bollinger.4 After Fordice, HBCUs are in a position
to promote “reverse racial integration” or “reverse racial diversity”
by encouraging non-black students, regardless of national origin,
to attend an HBCU. The long-term survival of HBCUs in the
twenty-first century depends on new admissions policies and dedi-
cated federal funding that explicitly supports a multilateral diver-
sity paradigm. True academic diversity should be driven by new
admissions policies that explicitly account for a student’s social and
economic status and intellectual experience. Practicing proper di-
versity requires the ability to distinguish between life-exposure di-
versity and a race-based policy that promotes racial integration as
an implied remedial measure. I am a strong promoter of racial in-
tegration at all colleges and universities regardless of their prior
history, but have opposed integration that accounts for race in ways
that do not conceive of white students and students of other races
as benefiting from diversity.5
lege that wants to keep its doors open will have to be both good enough
and welcoming enough to attract all types of students. We can keep our
great tradition and position of being a haven for students who need
nurturing, but we had better realize that more and more of those stu-
dents won’t be Black, and that we will have to reach out to everybody.
Sean B. Seymore, I’m Confused: How Can the Federal Government Promote Diversity in
Higher Education Yet Continue to Strengthen Historically Black Colleges?, 12 WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 287, 309 n.126 (2006) (citing Paul Ruffins, In a Society that is
Increasingly Diverse, What’s an HBCU to Do? BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 7, 1999,
at 22).
3 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992). The ambiguous standard from
Fordice and plausible conflicting explanations of the Court’s dicta regarding the future
of HBCUs created quite a controversy regarding the fate of HBCUs. One interpreta-
tion of Fordice’s confusing standard supports the sustained survival of public HBCUs
while another interpretation suggests that the Fordice standard commands abolishing
HBCUs. See discussion infra Part II.
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5 See L. Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create Educa-
tional Diversity While Attacking Socio-economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 297 (2005) (arguing that the educational achievement gap between a com-
petitive middle class education and the inferior education that others receive is due to
socioeconomic factors rather than continuing patterns of racial segregation).
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The American public must endorse effective economic poli-
cies on a “race-neutral” basis in order to achieve the twin goals of
racial integration and true academic diversity. By the term race-
neutral, I mean an approach that does not consider race as a fac-
tor. I reject the inference stated in Grutter that a race-blind admis-
sion system would have a dramatic negative effect on true diversity
because colleges may consider socioeconomic status and life expe-
rience factors in the admission process in order to achieve a di-
verse student body.6 Implementing race-conscious admission
policies in the name of academic diversity and academic freedom
places a blemish on the array of experiences existing at either
HBCUs or PWIs. Because institutions of higher education continue
to serve as a means to recognition and achievement in America, I
respectfully reject the suggestion that HBCUs do not play a vital
role in providing either racial diversity or life exposure diversity for
all students, regardless of race. The assertion that “[t]he mainte-
nance of HBCUs frustrates any sincere efforts to diversify predomi-
nately white institutions”7 is not well-founded because it inherently
assumes the majority of black students attending HBCUs would au-
tomatically attend PWIs, but for HBCUs.
By initially increasing educational opportunities for blacks,
particularly in the South, HBCUs won respect as significant institu-
tions for improving the general quality of the lives of African Amer-
icans.8 In 1992, Justice Thomas declared support for the continued
existence of HBCUs because they play a considerable role in the
education of African Americans.9 Although Justice Thomas is often
6 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320. The Supreme Court described the testimony provided
to the District Court by Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the University of Michigan Law
School’s expert. Dr. Raudenbush focused on
the predicted effect of eliminating race as a factor in the Law School’s
admission process. In Dr. Raudenbush’s view, a race-blind admissions
system would have a ‘very dramatic,’ negative effect on under-
represented minority admissions. He testified that in 2000, 35 percent
of underrepresented minority applicants were admitted. Dr.
Raudenbush predicted that if race were not considered, only 10 percent
of those applicants would have been admitted. Under this scenario, un-
derrepresented minority students would have comprised 4 percent of
the entering class in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent.
Id. (citation omitted).
7 Seymore, supra note 2, at 292.
8 Frank Adams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action Can Save
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REV. 481, 481 (1996) (citing Fordice,
505 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring)) (quoting CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, FROM ISOLATION TO MAINSTREAM: PROBLEMS OF THE COLLEGES FOUNDED
FOR NEGROES 11 (1971)).
9 See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 745–49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing JEAN L. PREER,
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regarded as a black person insensitive to the concerns of the Afri-
can American community, he is a strong and vocal supporter of
HBCUs. In Fordice, Justice Thomas agrees with the claim that
HBCUs represent a symbol of great achievement in black culture.10
However, a state cannot preserve the unique diversity of the Afri-
can American experience or traditional diversity by denying admis-
sion at either an HBCU or PWI to a student primarily because of
race.11 A state may manage a variety of colleges, including both
HBCUs and PWIs, to ensure accessible academic diversity to all on
a race-neutral basis, while accommodating well-known traditions
and curriculums that disproportionately attract one race or an-
other.12 In defense of HBCUs, Justice Thomas argues that program
repetition,13 designed to encourage race-neutral educational diver-
sity at either a PWI or an HBCU, is not remotely analogous to pro-
gram repetition intended to separate races for the purpose of
promoting racial segregation.14 Although Justice Thomas concurs
with the view that a state is not constitutionally obligated to main-
tain its HBCUs, he emphatically declares that the Court’s Fordice
opinion allows the state of Mississippi or any other state to preserve
and support HBCUs.15 According to Justice Thomas, it would be
ironic and peculiar if the HBCUs that nourished and fed blacks
during racial segregation were destroyed by judicial attempts to
fight the vestiges of the “separate but equal” doctrine.16
Part I of the article contends that HBCUs are transforming
into “Reverse Diversity Colleges and Universities” (“RDCUs”)
under the rationale of Grutter. Part II asserts that Fordice does not
require closure of racially identifiable RDCUs and supports the
conclusion that racial integration is justified because all students
benefit from integration. Additionally, Part II articulates the theory
that the federal government’s promotion of HBCUs with addi-
tional funding is contrary to its diversity initiatives at PWIs lacks
LAWYERS V. EDUCATORS: BLACK COLLEGES AND DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDU-
CATION 2 (1982)).
10 Id. at 748.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 748–49.
13 Id. at 738 (quoting Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1540 (N.D. Miss. 1987)
(explaining that program repetition refers “to those instances where two or more
institutions offer the same nonessential or noncore program. Under this definition,
all duplication at the bachelor’s level of nonbasic liberal arts and sciences course work
and all duplication at the master’s level and above are considered to be
unnecessary.”)).
14 Id. at 749.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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congruence unless one supports the conclusion that academic di-
versity under the Grutter rationale is a one-way street that starts and
ends on PWI campuses. Part III of the article argues that President
Barack Obama should establish unequivocal White House support
for HBCUs as RDCUs as a viable alternative to a constitutionally
permissible but problematic race-conscious diversity program.
I. HBCUS AS REVERSE DIVERSITY COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES
(“RDCUS”) UNDER THE RATIONALE OF GRUTTER
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court approved the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admission program
because a law school has a compelling state interest in realizing a
racially diverse student body since educational benefits are associ-
ated with such diversity.17 The Supreme Court held, under the
strict scrutiny standard of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,18 that it is permissible for a law school to use
race as a factor in making admissions decisions.19
Under a more expansive view of the diversity rationale articu-
lated in Grutter, it is necessary and proper for the federal govern-
ment to support HBCUs in order to promote “reverse racial
diversity.” Reverse racial diversity occurs when whites are en-
couraged to attend an HBCU because it will help them become
17 The Supreme Court stated:
We find that the Law School’s admissions program bears the hallmarks
of a narrowly tailored plan. As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly
individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities can-
not establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put mem-
bers of those groups on separate admissions tracks. Nor can universities
insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from
the competition for admission. Universities can, however, consider race
or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of individual-
ized consideration of each and every applicant.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19 The Supreme Court stated:
To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot
use a quota system–it cannot “insulate each category of applicants with
certain desired qualifications from competition with all other appli-
cants.” Instead, a university may consider race or ethnicity only as a
“‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file,” without “insulating the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.” In
other words, an admissions program must be “flexible enough to con-
sider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifi-
cations of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight.”
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citations omitted).
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better leaders in a multicultural society due to their intentional
learning experience as a reverse racial minority. The opportunity
to live and study as a reverse racial minority on an HBCU campus
exposes white students to nontraditional learning experiences that
will broaden their cultural and intellectual exposure. The federal
government advances both traditional diversity and reverse racial
diversity by providing financial support to HBCUs.20 This funding
clearly rejects Ward Connerly’s belief that HBCUs are inherently
not diverse.21
A recent study conducted by U.S. News and World Report, which
calculated the diversity of students on a law school campus, does
not support Connerly’s argument that HBCUs are inherently not
diverse.22 In fact, in the 2008 U.S. News & World Report: America’s
Best Graduate Schools edition, two historically black law schools were
ranked at the top of the “Most Diverse Law Schools” list.23 The
most diverse law school in the country is Thurgood Marshall Law
School at Texas Southern University, an HBCU. The second most
diverse law school is Florida A&M University, another HBCU.24
Furthermore, according to U.S. News and World Report, four of the
top seven most diverse law schools in the United States are at
HBCUs.25 African American students make up only forty-seven per-
cent of the population at both Texas Southern University and Flor-
ida A&M University’s law school.26 Law school diversity identifies
institutions where students have the greatest opportunity to meet
classmates from different racial or ethnic groups.27 U.S. News has
designed a diversity index centered on the entire percentage of
minority students excluding international students in the blend of
racial and ethnic clusters on campus.28 The diversity index is calcu-
lated by utilizing demographic data showing each law school’s stu-
20 Contra Seymore, supra note 2, at 292 (quoting Ward Connerly, At Issue: Are Ra-
cially Identifiable Colleges and Universities Good for the Country?, 13 CQ RESEARCHER 1061,
1061 (2003)).
21 Id. at 291–92 (citing Ward Connerly, At Issue: Are Racially Identifiable Colleges and
Universities Good for the Country?, 13 CQ Researcher 1061, 1061 (2003).
22 U.S. News & World Report, Schools of Law: The Most Diverse Schools, AMERICA’S
BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS, 2008, at 51.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, How We Calculate the Rankings, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 26, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/
best-graduate-schools/2008/03/26/how-we-do-the-numbers.html.
28 Id.
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dent body for the 2007–2008 academic years.29 Those students that
form the basis of the U.S. News law school diversity calculations are
African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanics, American Indians
and non-Hispanic Whites.30
I believe Americans continue to support HBCUs with federal
tax dollars every year because they understand intuitively that
HBCUs promote both the intellectual and professional growth of
blacks, while allowing whites and other minorities, who are not Af-
rican Americans, to experience a culturally diverse academic and
social lifestyle at an HBCU as a reverse racial or ethnic minority.
The diversity rationale of Grutter taken literally at a PWI is a one-
way street for the benefit of whites, according to Professor Kenneth
B. Nunn.31 Nunn’s characterization of Grutter creates a reasonable
inference that he does not view the Grutter rationale as significantly
expanding access to educational opportunities for blacks and other
minorities at PWIs. If Grutter is considered a one-way street for the
benefit of whites, it is not likely to be treated as a decision to help
establish social and economic empowerment for racial minorities
at PWIs. Nunn contends that the diversity rationale articulated in
Grutter stigmatizes people of color because the diversity regime pro-
moted by the Supreme Court permits African Americans to be
used at PWIs to benefit white students’ educational experiences.32
As a collection of individuals, people of color do not have an equal
diversity status before the Supreme Court under Grutter.33 How-
ever, “the group interests of the white majority are recognized, as
they are expressed through institutions that the white majority con-
trols. Thus, although the Supreme Court has demonstrated why
diversity might be good for white people, it fails to speak to why
diversity might be good for people of color.”34 Failure to support
HBCUs furthers an agenda that promotes separate but unequal di-
versity and leads to an unequal application of the Equal Protection
Clause.
On the other hand, encouraging white students to attend
HBCUs sends the message that white America endorses the con-
cept of “reverse diversity.” Reverse diversity expands on the Grutter
29 Id.
30 Id. The U.S. News & World Report law school diversity rankings include only law
schools accredited by the American Bar Association.
31 See Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 705, 725–27
(2008).
32 Id. at 723–24.
33 Id. at 724.
34 Id.
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diversity concept by recognizing not only the intellectual and cul-
tural benefits associated with the existence of black students on
PWI campuses, but also recognizing the cross-racial benefit that a
black student gains from the attendance of a white student at an
HBCU. The maintenance of an HBCU does not frustrate any sin-
cere efforts to diversify PWIs as suggested by Professor Seymore.35
II. FORDICE DOES NOT REQUIRE CLOSURE OF
RACIALLY IDENTIFIABLE RDCUS
If HBCUs and PWIs choose to implement admission policies
that give great weight to factors other than race, such as social and
economic status and life experience, it will not pose a challenge to
either traditional or reverse diversity. Justice White’s majority opin-
ion in Fordice is misconstrued by Seymore’s conclusion that the
opinion renders racially identifiable HCBUs as suspected of being
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.36 It
appears that Seymore has rejected the Supreme Court’s explicit
statement in Fordice “[t]hat an institution is predominantly white or
black does not in itself make out a constitutional violation.”37 It is
an unsupported and flawed equal protection theory that PWIs with
race-neutral policies may be presumed as constitutional while
HBCUs with identical race-neutral policies border on unconstitu-
tionality. This flawed analysis demonstrates a refusal to accept the
Court’s clearly articulated position in Fordice that the racial identity
of an HBCU or a PWI does not create a presumption of a constitu-
tional violation for either a PWI or an HBCU.38
While Fordice has been viewed as hostile to the very continua-
tion of HBCUs, pushed to its logical extreme, the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Fordice could require that all universities born in de
jure era states, PWIs and HBCUs, be subject to closure because of
their continuing racial identity.39 As a matter of pragmatic reality,
neither an HBCU nor a PWI is subject to closure merely because its
student body is racially identifiable. One constitutional theory
under which public HBCUs in former de jure states may be main-
tained after Fordice is the rationale utilized by the Supreme Court in
its ground-breaking Brown v. Board of Education opinion.40 Professor
35 Seymore, supra note 2, at 292.
36 Id. at 293.
37 Id. (quoting United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992)).
38 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992).
39 See Dannye Holley & L. Darnell Weeden, United States v. Fordice: The Mississippi
Aftermath, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 769 (1997).
40 Adams, supra note 8, at 489 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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Frank Adams contends, under a Brown analysis, that public HBCUs
may be preserved because HBCUs possess the intangible qualities
needed to make a quality education available to any learner who is
trying to find intellectual, cultural, and social diversity in an aca-
demic environment.41 An HBCU’s community reputation, dedi-
cated faculty, experienced administrators, as well as high-ranking
alumni meet the standard that the Supreme Court says points to-
ward greatness in a college or university.42  A voluntary, private de
facto separation of the races by individual actors free of state ac-
tion, at either a PWI or an HBCU, does not subject an HBCU or a
PWI to closure because of their continuing highly visible non-di-
verse racial identity. The destruction of HBCUs in the name of pro-
moting racial diversity would generate the public impression that
HBCUs are inferior to PWIs by promoting a stigma of racial inferi-
ority in access to public education, which the Brown Court con-
cluded was an unconstitutional violation of equality.43
Under the reverse diversity concept in the de facto era,
neither racially identifiable HBCUs nor PWIs are inherently in vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Fordice opinion is best
understood as promoting reverse diversity by essentially mandating
that HBCUs recruit and enroll white students. In 1992, the Su-
preme Court in Fordice ordered Mississippi to change its race-neu-
tral method in higher education to satisfy its duty to desegregate.44
The Fordice opinion recognized that unequal resource allocation
places Mississippi’s three HBCUs at a disadvantage.45 However, the
Supreme Court in Fordice ruled that remedial measures for further
funding be restricted to initiatives that encourage reverse racial di-
versity.46 As a result, a subsequent $500 million settlement agreed
to by the State of Mississippi, in an attempt to satisfy the Fordice
requirement to desegregate and create reverse diversity, is to some
extent subject to Mississippi’s three HBCUs’ capacity to recruit, en-
roll, and retain whites and other non-black students as reverse di-
41 Id. at 495.
42  Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
43 Id. at 497 (citing L. Darnell Weeden, Statutory and Equal Protection Remedies to
Save Historically Black Colleges from the Effects of Invidious Desegregation, 18 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 41, 46 (1992)).
44 Paul E. Sum, Steven Andrew Light & Ronald F. King, Race, Reform, and Desegrega-
tion in Mississippi Higher Education: Historically Black Institutions After United States v.
Fordice, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 403, 404 (2004).
45 Id.
46 Id.
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versity students.47
The conclusion that there is an intrinsic inconsistency be-
tween the federal government’s difficult tasks of strengthening
HBCUs while sponsoring traditional diversity at PWIs48 is rejected
because the federal government should have twin goals of advanc-
ing diversity at both HBCUs and PWIs. HBCUs were historically
placed within a dual system of separate and unequal higher educa-
tion because of the money provided to higher education under the
federally funded Morrill Acts49 as well as several United States Su-
preme Court cases.50 The historical racial discrimination in federal
funding and treatment has caused several HBCUs to continue to
suffer from the “separate but equal” doctrine. The federal govern-
ment takes the moral high ground when it provides funding to
make HBCUs stronger and more attractive to all students includ-
ing non-minorities in the name of both academic equity and aca-
demic diversity.51 The White House initiatives52 and the “HBCU
Aid Act”53 serve the purpose of helping to make HBCUs stronger
47 Id.
48 Seymore, supra note 2, at 303. Prof. Seymore argues that the federal govern-
ment’s support of HBCUs and the government’s criticism of the lack of diversity at
other public colleges and universities are competing initiatives that confuse both state
governments and the colleges and universities themselves.
49 The Morrill Acts provided eligible states with federal land that the individual
states could use for or put the proceeds of the sale toward establishing and funding
educational institutions with the purpose of, “without excluding other scientific and
classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as
are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of
the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical
education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life.” 7
U.S.C. § 304 (2006). See First Morrill Act of 1862, Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, § 1, 12
Stat. 503, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–308 (2006); Second Morrill Act of 1890, Act of August 30,
1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417, 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2006).
50 Seymore, supra note 2, at 297–98 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)).
51 Contra id.
52 The White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities seeks
to strengthen the capacity of HBCUs to provide excellence in education. See Exec.
Order No. 12232, 45 Fed. Reg. 53437 (Aug. 8, 1980); Exec. Order No. 12320, 46 Fed.
Reg. 46107 (Sep. 15, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12677, 54 Fed. Reg. 18869 (Apr. 28,
1989); Exec. Order No. 12876, 58 Fed. Reg. 58735 (Nov. 1, 1993); Exec. Order No.
13256, 67 Fed. Reg. 6823 (Feb. 12, 2002).
53 The Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Universities Act was passed
as Title III, Part B in the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat.
1219 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060–1063(c) (2006)). The Higher
Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008), was enacted
on August 14, 2008 and reauthorized and extended the Higher Education Act of
1965. This program provides financial assistance to HBCUs to establish or strengthen
their physical plants, financial management, academic resources, and endowment-
building capacity.
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RDCUs.
The contention that Fordice requires ending federal support of
HBCUs is unequivocally rejected as inconsistent with the concept
of reverse diversity.54 A theory that the federal government’s pro-
motion of HBCUs with additional funding is contrary to its diver-
sity initiatives at PWIs lacks congruence unless one supports the
conclusion that academic diversity, as articulated in Grutter, is a
one-way street that starts and ends on PWI campuses. An inclusive
and realistic view of Grutter’s academic diversity rationale must in-
clude a seat for HBCUs at the diversity table. I believe the theory
that HBCUs receive federal support because of white guilt and
America’s involvement with de facto segregation rather than an af-
firmation of reverse diversity must be rebuffed.55 The argument
that the federal government should invest in minority education at
the K–12 level in order to bridge the racial divide is supported.56
The federal government at the college level should aggressively
continue to financially support HBCUs to make them strong insti-
tutions in advancing the concept of reverse diversity.57 In 1987,
more than fifteen years before the Grutter opinion, I took the posi-
tion that law schools within HBCUs should view the affirmative ac-
tion concept as presenting a challenging opportunity for legal
educators at HBCUs to provide quality legal education to a mul-
tiethnic and diverse student body, while at the same time establish-
ing creative and innovative roles for legal education.58
I agree with the contention that the benefits of academic ra-
cial diversity as articulated by the Supreme Court in Grutter are
greatly exaggerated.59 The Supreme Court believes academic racial
54 Contra Seymore, supra note 2, at 303.
55 Contra id. at 312–18; cf. Kevin Brown & Vinay Sitapati, Lessons Learned From Com-
paring the Application of Constitutional Law and Federal Anti-Discrimination Law to African-
Americans in the U.S. and Dalits in India in the Context of Higher Education, 24 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 3, 7–8 (2008) (contending that justifications for HBCUs are not due
to a sense of guilt about the past oppressive treatment of one’s group but rather for
purposes of eliminating racial stereotypes, improving national security, and improv-
ing cross-racial understanding).
56 See Leland Ware, The Most Visible Vestige: Black Colleges after Fordice, 35 B.C. L.
Rev. 633 (1994).
57 See L. Darnell Weeden, Black Law Schools and the Affirmative Action Rationale, 12 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 395 (1987).
58 Id.
59 William B. Turner, “A Bulwark Against Anarchy”: Affirmative Action, Emory Law
School, and Southern Self-Help, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 195, 248 (2008) (citing
Brian N. Lizotte, Note: The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 625 (2006); see L. Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger, Higher Educa-
tion Must Keep Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 161
(2004); Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003). See also
12 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1
diversity qualifies as a compelling government interest at PWIs.60
The Supreme Court felt compelled to grant deference to the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School’s educational determination that
academic racial diversity, as a goal, is indispensable to its educa-
tional mission.61 Several amici briefs filed with the Supreme Court
corroborated the educational advantages inherent to the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s determination.62 The compelling interest in aca-
demic diversity declared by the Law School accepts a complex
educational judgment that rests, for the most part, within the
bounds of the University’s proficiency.63 I simply argue that the
problematic concept of academic racial diversity, adopted under
the Grutter rationale, is also applicable at HBCUs for the benefit of
their respective student bodies. In order to avoid sending the mes-
sage that the use of academic racial diversity is separate but equal,
the Grutter rationale must be applicable at HBCUs. In United States
v. Virginia the United States Supreme Court appropriately rejected
the State of Virginia’s attempt to exploit the academic racial diver-
sity rationale to support gender-based discrimination in higher ed-
ucation at some of its state supported colleges.64 However, it
Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER
& L. 43 (1997) (exploring state’s use of diversity as rationale for sex segregation in
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)). But see Matthew S. Lerner, Comment:
When Diversity Leads to Adversity: The Principles of Promoting Diversity in Educational Insti-
tutions, Premonitions of the Taxman v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1081
(1999) (arguing that diversity is as valuable among teachers and administrators as
among students)). Id. at 248 n.262.
60 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (explaining that the law school
possesses a compelling interest in a diverse student body because, in the Supreme
Court’s view, reaching a diverse student body is at the heart of the law school’s proper
institutional mission).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 330–32 (“[t]he Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bol-
stered by its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial,
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and
‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals.’”) Over fifty amici curiae submitted briefs in support
of the University of Michigan from a wide range of organizations including the Ameri-
can Bar Association, retired military generals, U.S. Senators and Congresspersons, as
well as General Motors and other professional organizations.
63 Id. at 328–29 (stating that “[t]oday, we hold that the Law School has a compel-
ling interest in attaining a diverse student body. The Law School’s educational judg-
ment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer. The Law School’s assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational bene-
fits is substantiated by respondents and their amici.”).
64 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). The United States sued the State
of Virginia and the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), Virginia’s only single-sex public
college, alleging that VMI’s male-exclusive admission policy violated the Equal Protec-
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appears that the Supreme Court believes that educational benefits
of a racially engineered student body in the name of academic ra-
cial diversity is permissible under the strict scrutiny standard,65
while a gender engineered student body in the name of educa-
tional equity is not permissible under a less than strict scrutiny stan-
dard. I am not advocating support for the Supreme Court’s racial
engineering approach to approve race-based diversity thinly dis-
guised as academic diversity implicitly adopted in Grutter. The con-
cept of “belief life experience,” defined as the life exposure of an
individual student, would enhance the opportunity for a cross-ra-
cial understanding of social and economic status for the historical
majority student body. This is a true race-neutral basis for achiev-
ing academic diversity at either a PWI or an HBCU.  Since the Su-
preme Court’s flawed Grutter rationale allows race to be considered
as a factor when making academic diversity decisions, it only stands
to reason that when implementing reverse academic diversity, it is
equally constitutionally permissible to use race as a factor to pro-
mote nontraditional diversity at an HBCU.
One commentator, Brian Lizotte, contends that the Supreme
Court proclamation in Grutter, that racial diversity generates impor-
tant educational advantages that justify racial favoritism in public
university admissions, is not supported by social science.66 If truth
be told, social science does not have the ability to prove that race-
based student body diversity creates specific educational benefits.67
Lizotte claims that since the Grutter diversity rationale is not capa-
ble of proof by social science, racial diversity cannot be established
as a compelling governmental interest.68 Although I think Grutter’s
race-based diversity rationale is flawed, I believe that true race-neu-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme
Court held, under a heightened standard of review, that Virginia’s exclusion of wo-
men from VMI’s educational opportunities and civilian leadership development de-
nied women the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 534–46.
65 Turner, supra note 59, at 248.
66 Brian N. Lizotte, Note: The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 625, 667–68 (2006).
67 Id.
68 Id. Lizotte challenges the social science research upon which the Grutter Court
relied on when holding that a diverse student body produces educational benefits. By
criticizing the Grutter theory and methodology, Lizotte explains how the research fails
to prove educational benefits; and by reflecting on the logic underlying social science
by and large, he illustrates how the causal relationship is, technically, not verifiable.
He contends social science is capable of only speaking to what might be true. Ulti-
mately, a diversity interest is an unstable basis for affirmative action policy—definitely
not compelling. Id. at 629.
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tral academic diversity that is based on life experience is a constitu-
tionally permissible approach for a public university under the
rational basis standard applied to social or economic governmental
action.69
Courts frequently doubt the usefulness of social science re-
search that concerns the injuries caused by racial isolation and the
advantages of racial diversity in a public education.70 A jurist’s view
of the law and her personal experiences with education “may be-
come the prism through which she refracts the social science evi-
dence about the effects of school racial compositions that come
before her.”71 A reverse racial diversity role for HBCUs under the
rationale of Grutter will reduce the racial isolation of whites, blacks
and other students of color who choose to attend an HBCU. Fordice
is a racial diversity opinion because it requires Mississippi’s public
HBCUs to achieve reverse racial diversity by reducing racial isola-
tion of black students on their campuses.72
In Fordice, the Supreme Court held that Mississippi was obli-
gated to change its “race-neutral” method in higher education in
order to fulfill its duty to reduce racial isolation at its HBCUs.73
Although Fordice recognized that Mississippi’s unequal resource al-
location adversely impacted its three HBCUs, the Court required
that remedial additional funding at HBCUs be limited to conduct
that immediately advances reverse racial diversity.74 As a result, the
$500 million settlement agreed to by Mississippi under Fordice and
the ensuing lower federal court decisions was contingent on an
HBCU’s capacity to recruit, enroll, and maintain “other-race” stu-
dents.75 Fordice was a breakthrough decision requiring reverse di-
69 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
70 Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Twenty-First Century Social Science on School Racial Diversity
and Educational Outcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173, 1176 (2008).
71 Id. at 1177.
72 See Sum, supra note 44, at 404.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. Ayers v. Allain is the trial court version of the Supreme Court’s Fordice deci-
sion. In Ayers v. Allain the primary defendants were the Governor of the State of Mis-
sissippi, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, as well as the
individual members sued in their personal and official capacities, all the institutions
identified as the historically white institutions and their principal administrative of-
ficers, the State Department of Education, and the State Superintendent of Educa-
tion. 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (N.D. Miss. 1987). The defendants have for many years
made clear their wish to attract and recruit minority race students at every institution,
in particular the historically white institutions. Each institution employs various tech-
niques in bringing about this objective. For example, universities use other-race
recruiters with the specific objective to recruit other-race students. Id. at 1557–58. In
the context of the district court opinion in Ayers v. Allain an other-race student may be
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versity in higher education at HBCUs.76 Under the rationale of
Fordice, and subsequently in Grutter, the Supreme Court assumed
that either traditional or reverse racial diversity provided an educa-
tional advantage to the predominant group on a college campus
because it reduces de facto racial isolation. In Grutter, the Supreme
Court relied on research studies and amicus curiae briefs in sup-
port of their conclusion that a racially diverse student body pro-
vides an educational advantage by improving academic learning
while encouraging an environment of cross-racial understanding.77
Regardless of the debatable benefits of court mandated racial
diversity, Mississippi’s three HBCUs are in a no-win situation be-
cause of Fordice.78 Although Mississippi’s HBCUs’ apparent contem-
porary deficiencies are the creation of past state authorized racial
discrimination, Mississippi’s public HBCUs can now remedy the sit-
uation only if they accept a reverse academic racial diversity rem-
edy in which successful implementation is outside their power.79 A
Fordice reverse racial diversity remedy is outside the power of
HBCUs in Mississippi if perceptions of race among eligible white
students are a controlling factor in making a decision about choice
of college.80 HBCUs have to find a way to reconcile the inherent
tension between Fordice’s court-ordered reverse racial diversity at
HBCUs and the traditional way whites think of race in Mississippi.81
Some commentators theorize that race is a key factor in college
choice for qualified white students in Mississippi.82 If this is true,
the Fordice pronouncements will have token practical impact in ac-
complishing either traditional or reverse institutional racial diver-
sity within the Mississippi university system.83 In Fordice, Justice
Thomas described institutional diversity as a “diverse assortment of
institutions—including historically black institutions—open to all
on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions and pro-
grams that might disproportionately appeal to one race or
defined as either a student or potential student whose presence at either a PWI or an
HBCU renders him or her a racial minority when compared to the majority members
of the student body.
76 See Sum, supra note 44, at 404.
77 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
78 Sum, supra note 44, at 433.
79 Id. A reverse racial diversity remedy is outside of an HBCUs power only if racial
attitudes continue to restrict which Mississippians’ voluntary enrollment decisions. See
id.
80 Id. at 412.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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another.”84
In an attempt to become more attractive to other-race stu-
dents, HBCUs may find it very useful to appeal to those students
under a theory of racial integration rather than racial desegrega-
tion. According to one commentator, Justice Kennedy’s concur-
ring opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 185 offers separate rationales for the integration and de-
segregation of public education.86 Justice Kennedy’s justification
for integration is grounded in the belief that all school students
benefit from integration.87 This justification differs considerably
from the rationale for desegregation that is construed as only bene-
fiting black students.88 Justice Kennedy’s down-to-earth justifica-
tion for integration in public education stresses the importance of
racial diversity/integration as benefiting our society as a whole.89
This rationale will help HBCUs recruit white students under the
Fordice requirement and to expand reverse diversity by demonstrat-
ing to white students and their parents that they will receive a com-
petitive education at an HBCU while simultaneously advancing the
goal of increasing cross-racial understanding through academic di-
84 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring).
85 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
86 Kevin Brown, Reflections On Justice Kennedy’s Opinion In Parents Involved: Why
Fifty Years Of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 740 (2008). In
discussing the implications of Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Parents In-
volved, Professor Brown contends that the opinion will likely come to define the terms
upon which public school districts may pursue school integration. Brown argues that
Justice Kennedy offers a different rationale for the integration of public schools than
he does for desegregation. The rationale for integration is rooted in the belief that all
school children will benefit from integration. This differs abruptly from the rationale
for desegregation, which viewed desegregation as only benefiting black students. As a
consequence, according to Brown, every student—including white students—will
profit from integration. Id.
87 Id. (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
88  Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485–86 (1992) (quoting Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court said that it is the
duty and responsibility of a school district that was previously segregated by law to
take all steps needed in order to do away with the vestiges of the unconstitutional de
jure system. This is necessary in order to make sure that the fundamental wrong of
the de jure system, the injuries and stigma impose upon the race disfavored by the
infringement no longer exists. This was the underlying principle and the intent of
Brown I and Brown II. In Brown I the Supreme Court stated: “To separate [black stu-
dents] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
89 Id.
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versity. Under the desegregation rationale articulated by Chief Jus-
tice Warren in Brown I, it was believed that blacks were culturally
deprived because of racial isolation and that school desegregation
was exclusively for their benefit.90  Under this theory it was gener-
ally taken for granted that white students did not gain any advan-
tage from the attendance of black students at predominantly white
schools.91 Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved in Community Schools92
asserts racial diversity/integration in public schools enlightens all
students regardless of race because these students benefit from the
interactive hands-on experience of seeing that America’s freedom
is protected by people of distinctive races, creeds, and cultures.93
One commentator says Justice Kennedy has adopted a positive utili-
tarian justification for racial integration of public schools, colleges,
and universities that is likely to unite students from different racial
and ethnic backgrounds around the theme of benefiting society by
protecting freedom.94 Under the theory that racial diversity/inte-
gration in higher education is a benefit to all students who believe
in a multi-racial effort to protect American freedom, HBCUs offer
students of other races a unique cultural experience in an intellec-
tually challenging and nourishing environment.
Professor Alex M. Johnson maintains that Fordice failed to cre-
ate a situation in higher education that truly values the diversity/
integration concept.95 The Fordice decision undermines the educa-
tional diversity of cultural tolerance by not requiring equal funding
in order to help African Americans at Mississippi’s three HBCUs
climb beyond their subordinated social status entering the contest
for educational excellence with whites on equal terms while volun-
tarily attending an HBCU.96 Fordice should have granted either
equal or enhanced funding to HBCUs so that they can implement
curricula in physical structures that whites or other-race students
may find appealing to interact with the unique cultural and aca-
demic experience provided at an HBCU. Professor Johnson sup-
ports a practice of non-coercive diversity/integration that permits
African Americans to liberally decide how to approach mainstream
society and culture with the choice to attend either an HBCU or a
90 Id. at 742 (citing Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494–95).
91 Id.
92 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
93 Brown, supra note 86, at 743.
94 Id.
95 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integra-
tionism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1467 (1993).
96 Id. at 1468.
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PWI.97 Johnson defends HBCUs because these schools pass on and
safeguard African American culture, a culture that must be appre-
ciated in order for integration/racial diversity to be achieved.98
Under the reverse racial diversity theory, whites and other-race stu-
dents may be given a choice to experience African American cul-
ture at either an HBCU or a PWI. A reading of Fordice that requires
the closure of HBCUs will deny whites and other-race students the
opportunity to embrace reverse racial or cultural diversity in an au-
thentic predominantly African American setting.
According to Johnson, the Fordice line of attack on racial segre-
gation is inconsistent because the Court failed to adopt the view
that true equality and racial diversity or cultural diversity can be
achieved by maintaining both HBCUs and PWIs based on students’
voluntary freedom of choice.99 I support HBCUs because they al-
low for traditionally disadvantaged African American students to
join and properly negotiate the advantage of mainstream Ameri-
can society. By providing a non-threatening environment for Afri-
can Americans to learn about white cultural norms and how to
properly handle an integrated mainstream American society as ed-
ucated professionals, HBCUs serve as virtual safe teaching houses
for many economically disadvantaged African Americans.
Using the Fordice rationale to close HBCUs unnecessarily
forces African American students to make college their point of
integration into mainstream white culture regardless of their per-
sonal preferences.100 One of the advantages of a reverse diversity
student attending an HBCU is the opportunity to see first-hand
American mainstream values as well as traditional academic subject
matters being taught to predominantly black students by a critical
mass of well prepared African American professors. White students
electing to attend an HBCU will be exposed to a critical mass of
bright and intelligent black student peers as well as black faculty
members, thereby increasing whites exposure to blacks in higher
education. A reverse minority diversity student attending an HBCU
will increase the type of cross-racial understanding approved by the
Supreme Court in Grutter. A white student’s opportunity to experi-
ence intellectual enhancement as a reverse diversity student at an
HBCU with a critical mass of black intellectuals will be prematurely
lost if the Fordice and Grutter cases are improperly construed as re-
97 Id. at 1432–55.
98 Id. at 1432.
99  Id. at 1468.
100 Id. at 1446.
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quiring the closure of HBCUs in the name of racial diversity/
integration.
Professor Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond declares that if racial di-
versity in the student body is an important goal for HBCUs, maybe
HBCUs will come to think of Fordice as the inspiration for initiating
a different and more progressive perception of HBCUs.101 Alcorn
State University, a Mississippi HBCU, has displayed how it met the
mandatory academic racial diversity requirement of Fordice as well
as how to achieve the voluntary racial diversity goals that are consti-
tutionally permissible under Grutter.102
HBCUs also may become attractive to all students regardless of
race and advance socioeconomic integration by promoting class di-
versity in their admissions policies—a form of diversity subject to
rational basis review by the courts.103 A significant advantage of ad-
vancing this type of integration at both HBCUs and PWIs is that
socioeconomic status is not a proxy for race, and will be subject to
101 Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Black, White, Brown, Green, and Fordice: The Flavor of
Higher Education in Louisiana and Mississippi, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 57, 126
(2008).
102 Id. at 127. Alcorn State University is the only historically black university in Mis-
sissippi that effectively met the three-year, ten-percent other-race student enrollment
target and was entitled to receive its pro rata share of the principal established under
the public endowment pursuant to a settlement agreement. Alcorn was able to
achieve this objective because of its aggressive marketing and recruitment policies. Id.
103 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court considered a non-race-
based preference for socially or economically “disadvantaged” applicants for govern-
ment contracts as not provoking a significant issue regarding constitutional authority
under the rational basis standard. 515 U.S. 200, 211–12 (1995); see also, San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); see Eboni S. Nelson, The Availa-
bility and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-Parents Involved, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 841,
843 n.22 (2008); e.g., Richard Fallon, Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1931 (1996) (“Affirmative action [based on economic disad-
vantage] would not trigger strict judicial scrutiny, and it would almost surely survive
rational basis review in nearly any imaginable context.”); Richard D. Kahlenberg,
Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (1996) (“[C]lass-based prefer-
ences provide a constitutional way to achieve greater racial and ethnic diversity, be-
cause they do not use a suspect category for decision making. Racial preferences are
subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, but class preferences are
not.”); Eboni S. Nelson, Parents Involved & Meredith: A Prediction Regarding the
(Un)Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 293,
327 (2006) (concluding that socioeconomic integration efforts are not subject to the
potentially “fatal standard of strict scrutiny because they neither employ racial classifi-
cations nor seek to achieve racial diversity benefits”); L. Darnell Weeden, Creating
Race-Neutral Diversity in Federal Procurement in a Post-Adarand World, 23 WHITTIER L.
REV. 951, 967–68 (2002) (“A truly race-neutral affirmative action plan will not impli-
cate the Adarand strict scrutiny test, because such plans are designed to create social
and economic class-based diversity for disadvantaged persons . . . regardless of race,
and thus are subject to the rational basis test.”).
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rational basis review104 rather than strict scrutiny review required
under the race-conscious higher education diversity rationale ar-
ticulated in Grutter.105 Under the rational basis standard, govern-
mental policy advancing socioeconomic diversity at either an
HBCU or a PWI would be presumed valid under relevant Supreme
Court precedent.106 In an effort to prioritize socioeconomic inte-
gration, HBCUs can achieve their transformative role of encourag-
ing white and non-traditional minority students to enroll by
providing them with more choices in higher education.
Alcorn State University effectively achieved the three-year real-
ization of their 10% other-race student enrollment goal due to its
hard-hitting efforts in marketing and recruitment of non-black stu-
dents.107 Alcorn State University did not target other-race students
who were predisposed to rejecting enrollment at an HBCU.108
Targeted other-race students accepting enrollment at Alcorn State
University include Mississippi residents as well as residents from
Australia, Canada, and Russia.109 Alcorn State University should be
applauded for promoting true international diversity among its stu-
dents. The diversity approaches taken by Alcorn State University
will not only help to promote cross-racial understanding; they will
also promote understanding among international students in the
global economy.
Although Alcorn State University has experienced a degree of
104 Nelson, supra note 103, at 843. Under rational basis review the well-known rule
is that legislation is presumed to be legal and will be upheld if the classification drawn
by the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
174–75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic legislation is the subject of a constitu-
tional challenge, the Equal Protection Clause allocates wide latitude to the states,
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174; New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. at 303.
105 In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court approved the University of Michigan
Law School’s race-conscious admission program because a law school has a compel-
ling state interest in realizing a racially diverse student body since educational benefits
are associated with such diversity. 539 U.S. at 334. The Supreme Court held, under
the strict scrutiny standard of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that it is permissible for a law school to use race as a factor in making admis-
sions decisions. Id.
106 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding a
Massachusetts law requiring state police officers to retire at age fifty even though the
state did not engage in individualized testing to determine an officer’s ability to con-
tinue to perform the job).
107 Sellers Diamond, supra note 101, at 127.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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success in recruiting whites and other racial minorities who are
non-black, Professor Kevin Brown is correct in his assertion that
the eventual effect of Fordice on public HBCUs remains un-
known.110 Professor Brown contends that the Fordice decision
clearly supports the specific constitutional conclusion that states
are not constitutionally required to strengthen and upgrade public
HBCUs as a method of expanding the educational opportunities of
blacks.111 While it is true that Fordice does not require a state to
enhance its funding of an HBCU to promote racial diversity, it is
equally clear that Fordice does not prohibit a state or the federal
government from providing funds to strengthen HBCUs as reverse
racially diverse academic enclaves born under freedom of
choice.112 One commentator correctly observes that it is hard to
predict the definitive judicial impact of Fordice due to the opinion’s
confusing standards and the dicta concerning Mississippi’s
HBCUs.113 In Fordice, the Court’s dicta implied that by continuing a
racially identifiable university, a state might be violating the Consti-
tution.114 In addition, the Court’s dicta suggested that closing or
merging HBCUs might cure the discriminatory results of the pre-
sent system.115 The ambiguous standard of Fordice and plausible
conflicting explanations of the Court’s dicta regarding the future
HBCUs created mixed messages regarding the fate of HBCUs.116
One interpretation of Fordice’s confusing standards supports the
sustained survival of public HBCUs while another interpretation
suggests that the Fordice standard commands abolishing HBCUs.117
110 Brown, supra note 55, at 36.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 John A. Moore, Are State-Supported Historically Black Colleges and Universities Justifia-
ble After Fordice? A Higher Education Dilemma, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 556 (2000).
114  Id. The Court in Fordice stated: “Because the former de jure segregated system of
public universities in Mississippi impeded the free choice of prospective students, the
State in dismantling that system must take the necessary steps to ensure that this
choice now is truly free. The full range of policies and practices must be examined
with this duty in mind. That an institution is predominantly white or black does not in
itself make out a constitutional violation. But surely the State may not leave in place
policies rooted in its prior officially segregated system that serve to maintain the racial
identifiability of its universities if those policies can practicably be eliminated without
eroding sound educational policies.” 505 U.S. 717, 742–43 (1992).
115 Moore, supra note 113, at 556; see Fordice, 505 U.S. at 742.
116 Moore, supra note 113, at 556. What the Fordice standard actually means is simply
not clear. It is clear that Fordice established an ambiguous standard as it connects to
the future role of HBCUs. Subsequent Fordice interpretations demonstrate that there
is a clear dichotomy as to how the Fordice standard applies to HBCUs. One interpreta-
tion supports the continued existence of public HBCUs while a different interpreta-
tion advises that the Fordice standard would require eliminating HBCUs. Id.
117 Id.
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An important interpretation of Fordice, supporting the reten-
tion of public HBCUs, came from the United States Department of
Education (“DOE”).118 In 1994, the DOE announced its interpreta-
tion of Fordice and the implication for public HBCUs.119 The DOE
interpreted the Fordice standard as consistent with a state’s commit-
ment to support and protect public HBCUs.120 The DOE “revised
criteria” acknowledged that in order to meet the Fordice standard, a
state system of higher education might find it necessary to
strengthen and improve HBCUs to correct the consequences of
prior discrimination.121 In 1994, the DOE said it would strictly scru-
tinize state plans to close or merge HBCUs as well as any other
conduct that diminishes the unique roles of HBCUs.122 The DOE’s
interpretation of Fordice is an example of how interpretations by a
federal administrative agency within the executive branch can im-
pact the future existence of public HBCUs.123 It is necessary and
proper for President Barack Obama’s administration to instruct
the DOE to develop regulations and provide financial support to
ensure the continuing existence of HBCUs as transformative insti-
tutions of both racial and intellectual diversity in a changing global
market place.124 HBCUs need strong support from the DOE in or-
der to effectively enforce the congressional goal of strengthening
HBCUs as instruments of expanding cross-racial understanding in
America and around the world.
III. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA SHOULD EMPHASIZE WHITE HOUSE
SUPPORT FOR HBCUS AS RDCUS AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE RACE CONSCIOUS
DIVERSITY PRACTICES
I would like to make it crystal clear that I am not recom-
mending that President Obama or anyone else support HBCUs as
state-funded black enclaves with race-conscious admission policies.
Although the Grutter opinion allows for race-conscious admission
policies at a PWI, and presumably at an HBCU, life exposure or
academic diversity based on intellectual energy should be achieved
118 Id.
119 Moore, supra note 113, at 556–57 (citing Notice of Application of Supreme
Court Decision, 59 Fed. Reg. 4271 (Dep’t Educ. Jan. 31, 1994)).
120 Id. at 557.
121 Notice of Application of Supreme Court Decision, 59 Fed. Reg. 4271 (Dep’t
Educ. Jan. 31, 1994).
122 Id.
123 Moore, supra note 113, at 556–57.
124 Id.
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on a race-neutral basis.125 Similar to other specialized higher edu-
cation institutions, such as religious colleges and women’s colleges,
HBCUs provide a diversity of choice for those seeking educational
environments that are consistent with their personal values and ex-
periences on a race-neutral basis.126 As long as HBCUs are open to
all applicants regardless of race, they improve both equality and
diversity while increasing opportunities for blacks without restrict-
ing the preferences of others.127 However, African American cul-
ture is not an indispensable component of the formal curriculum
at HBCUs as suggested by Professor Leland Ware.128 The incredi-
ble day-to-day mission of a typical HBCU involves teaching a large
number of at-risk college students from disadvantaged educational
backgrounds how to negotiate the standard college curriculum
successfully. While teaching traditional academic subject matter,
most professors at an HBCU regardless of their race understand
that they must model mainstream cultural norms for their stu-
dents’ future success as educators and professionals. Unlike Ware, I
believe essential elements of the African American culture can be
maintained and honored at both PWIs and HBCUs.129 It is not fair
to engage in reverse racial stereotyping by suggesting that all PWIs’
black students are marginalized because at every level PWIs close
their eyes to the involvement of African Americans in art, literature
and science.130
Ware concludes, at a very superficial level, that the arguments
supporting the continuance of HBCUs resemble those articulated
125 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
126 Moore, supra note 113, at 567.
127 Id. (citing SERBRENIA J. SIMS, DIVERSIFYING HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES: A NEW HIGHER EDUCATION PARADIGM 12 (1994)).
128 Leland Ware, The Most Visible Vestige: Black Colleges After Fordice, 35 B.C. L. REV.
633, 675 (1994). Professor Ware states:
Perhaps most importantly, African–American culture and accomplish-
ment are essential ingredients in the curriculum at black colleges.
These attributes cannot be replicated at white universities where black
students are marginalized and the program of study ignores the contri-
butions of African-Americans to art, literature and the sciences. The
paradox of the arguments made in favor of black colleges is that they
seem in some ways to be the same as claims that were made by defend-
ers of segregation when Brown was argued. They could be construed as
accepting the Plessy rationale that separate but equal schools for black
students would be preferable, or at least as good as receiving an educa-
tion in an integrated environment.
Id. at 675-76.
129 Contra id.
130 See id.
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by defenders of segregation in Brown.131 Arguments made in de-
fense of HBCUs have been wrongly interpreted as requesting sepa-
rate but equal schools for black students at HBCUs.132 A separate
but equal argument by the supporters of HBCUs would indeed be
at odds with the integrationist theory of Brown.133 The plaintiffs in
Fordice did not seek to repeat the transgressions of racial segrega-
tion in violation of Brown,134 rather they sought the preservation of
black institutions on race-neutral and equal terms.  The goal of
Brown was to remove students from a separate and under-funded
system of racially segregated schools at every level.135 HBCUs that
were created during the era of U.S. segregation survived while
teaching and coaching thousands of black students with very inade-
quate resources.136 The historic triumph and continuing achieve-
ment of HBCUs is evidence of their power to overcome giant
obstacles.137 Ware correctly maintains the abolition of de jure seg-
regation does not indicate that HBCUs are no longer necessary.138
HBCUs are indispensible because forced racial integration does
not respect an African American student’s freedom to choose be-
tween a predominantly black or white college as the best path to
successfully assimilate into mainstream American society.139 In
Fordice, Justice Scalia stated that congressional support of HBCUs is
constitutionally permissible because students may choose to attend
HBCUs regardless of race, thereby not sending the message of ra-
cial inferiority prohibited by Brown.140 If the Supreme Court’s
Fordice test is intended to eliminate HBCUs Justice Scalia would re-
ject the test and support the position that “if no [state] authority
exists to deny [the student] the right to attend the institution of his
choice, he is done a severe disservice by remedies which” deny him
the freedom of choice.141
If Fordice is construed as the Supreme Court’s constitutionally
mandated antagonism toward racially identifiable schooling at
HBCUs that did not result from state action, this interpretation by
131 Id.
132 Id. at 675–76.
133 Id. at 676.
134 Ware, supra note 128, at 676.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See Johnson, Jr., supra note 95, at 1418.
140 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 760 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141 Id. (quoting Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 647, 687 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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commentators is assuredly not good constitutional law.142 The Con-
stitution does not prohibit racially identifiable HBCUs since
neither blacks nor whites are required to attend because of their
race and either a black or a white is free to make a private choice
whether to attend or not.143 I believe that Congress continues to
authorize the President to support the strengthening of HBCUs
with federal tax dollars because Congress understands that closing
the doors of HBCUs is not only poor social policy but also mini-
mizes both racial and academic diversity.144
Ten years after Fordice, President George W. Bush demon-
strated a strong show of support for HBCUs.145 On February 12,
2002, President Bush stated that he supported making HBCUs
stronger because HBCUs are recognized (1) for cultivating latent
human talent in America; (2) for expanding equal expectations in
higher education; (3) for offering an attractive education; and (4)
in need of assistance in order to take part in federal programs on
terms and conditions similar to colleges and universities that are
not HBCUs.146 Executive Order No. 13,256 established a Presiden-
tial advisory committee in the Office of the Secretary of Education
named the “President’s Board of Advisors on Historically Black
Colleges and Universities” (the “Board”).147 The Board was given
the duty of planning and delivering an annual report to the Presi-
dent regarding the involvement of HBCUs in federal programs.148
The Board is obligated to give advice to the President and to the
Secretary of Education concerning the requirements of HBCUs on
subjects relating to infrastructure, academic curriculums, along
with faculty and institutional improvement.149 Although President
Bush issued a proclamation declaring September 28, 2001, as “Na-
tional Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week,” some
commentators doubt the sincerity of his efforts in support of
HBCUs because he did not support the Grutter rationale for race-
142 Id.
143 Id. at 760–61.
144 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060–1063(c) (1992).
145 See Exec. Order No. 13,256, 67 Fed. Reg. 6823 (Feb. 12, 2002); Congress en-
acted the Strengthening Historically Black Colleges and Universities Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1060–1063(c) (1992), under Title III of the Higher Education Act. Congress incor-
porated Title III, Part B in the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79
Stat. 1219 (1965). Title III, Part B is codified and amended by 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1060–1063(c) (1992).
146 Exec. Order No. 13,256, 67 Fed. Reg. 6823 (Feb. 12, 2002).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149  Id.
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based diversity as the only path to educational equity.150 Unlike
these commentators, I do not believe the Bush administration’s ef-
fort to strengthen HBCUs is “hard to reconcile with its amici sup-
porting the petitioners in Grutter and Gratz”151 because I do not
limit diversity to the type of racial diversity thinly disguised as aca-
demic diversity approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter. Presi-
dent Bush’s support of HBCUs is consistent with his approval of a
diversity agenda in higher education because true intellectual di-
versity or non-racial diversity can be achieved at either a PWI or an
HBCU by race-neutral means under a freedom of choice plan.
However, those who share the unfounded belief that HBCUs are
inherently and forever non-diverse based on an institutional racial
identity regardless of cultural and intellectual diversity will object
to any U.S. president’s support for HBCUs, including President
Obama’s.
President Bush’s attempts to strengthen HBCUs benefited
him politically and the GOP’s standing in the black community.152
Similar to his immediate predecessor in the White House, I believe
President Obama will find that taking an active role in strengthen-
ing HBCUs is a political asset rather than a political liability. Unfor-
tunately President Obama’s education budget has provoked
leaders of HBCUs to challenge the reduction in a federal program
viewed as a financial lifeline for their schools and students.153 The
President’s education budget made public on Thursday, May 7,
2009, failed to provide $85 million dollars to HBCUs, which they
have collected once a year for the past two years.154 The two-year-
old program provides money directly to federally recognized
HBCUs.155 Although other direct federal money assisting HBCUs is
projected to grow from $238 million to $250 million, the loss that
the HBCU fund will incur under President Obama is a $73 million
reduction in financial support.156 Because HBCUs have suffered a
150 Seymore, supra note 2, at 304.
151 Id. at 304–05 (citing Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Serving the Educational Interests
of African-American Students at Brown Plus Fifty: The Historically Black College or University
and Affirmative Action Programs, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1877, 1885 n.29  (2004) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
152 Id. at 305.
153 Justin Pope, Black Colleges Will Fight Cut to Federal Program, USA TODAY, May 12,
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-05-12-black-
colleges_N.htm.
154 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION 67 (2009), http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget10/
summary/10summary.pdf.
155 Id.
156 Id.
2009] HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES 27
great deal under the current recession, HBCU leaders maintain
that this is not the time for the Obama administration to substan-
tially reduce funding for programs giving direct support to HBCUs
since they play a significant role in educating the neediest college
students in America.157 Although the 105 federally recognized
HBCUs amount to only 3% of U.S. colleges, they provide nearly
20% of undergraduate degrees earned by blacks, according to the
United Negro College Fund (“UNCF”).158 HBCUs need strong fed-
eral financial support because they are still haunted by the vestiges
of the racially discriminatory separate but equal system in higher
education.159 “We believe it is in the best interest of our country to
ensure that [HBCUs] are strong,” asserts John Donohue, UNCF’s
executive vice president for development.160 Donohue stated that
the federal program to which the Obama Administration proposes
to deny funding supported an important college readiness project
at Dillard University, an HBCU in New Orleans.161 United States
Senator Richard Burr, Republican of North Carolina, whose state is
home to eleven HBCUs, appropriately expressed reservation about
the Obama administration’s priorities in reducing direct funding
to HBCUs while leaving untouched $9 million in financial support
for whaling history museums.162 It appears higher education offi-
cials think that Congress will not support the $85 million reduction
in funds to HBCUs.163 Terry Hartle, senior vice president of the
American Council on Education, believes the proposed $85 mil-
lion reduction in funding to HBCUs will not survive because
HBCUs have strong champions in both political parties, as well as
in both houses of Congress.164
Some commentators contend that creative reports alleging
that President Obama permitted major funding cuts for HBCUs
are misplaced.165 Kim Lampkins of American Urban Radio Net-
works argues that the theory that Obama is the man who reduced
157 Id.
158 United Negro College Fund, Our Member Colleges: About HBCUs, http://
www.uncf.org/members/aboutHBCU.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
159 Seymore, supra note 2, at 299.
160 Pope, supra note 153.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Boyce Watkins, Bottom Line with Dr. Boyce: Did Barack Obama REALLY Cut HBCU
Funding?, BLACKVOICES.COM, May 27, 2009, http://www.blackvoices.com/blogs/2009/
05/27/bottom-line-with-dr-boyce-did-barack-obama-really-cut-hbcu-fun/.
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money for HBCUs is misguided.166 According to Lampkins,
“[c]ontrary to the Internet chatter stating otherwise, the Obama
Administration’s education budget does not cut funds to Histori-
cally Black Colleges and Universities.”167 Ms. Lampkins contends
that the Obama administration’s failure to extend the College Cost
Reduction and Access Act (“CCRAA”), which provided $170 mil-
lion dollars annually for two years to help HBCUs become finan-
cially independent, is justified because the grant was supposed to
end.168 After reviewing a copy of the educational budget of the
Obama administration, a few assert that President Obama’s budget
for fiscal year 2010 indicates a $20,830,000 enhancement in appro-
priation for HBCUs over the prior year.169 Some believe that this
budget expansion for HBCUs is misunderstood as President
Obama not supporting black colleges.170
The Obama administration must understand the symbolism
that affirmative federal funding—or cuts in funding—from the ex-
ecutive presents when an HBCU is a nurturing mother figure in
the black community. I believe most people familiar with the Afri-
can American community know that as a matter of historical sym-
bolism you do not give mother HBCU $85 million every Mother’s
Day for two consecutive years and then stop and tell her that she
had no right to expect that money without creating unnecessary
tension in the family.171 The message to the Obama administration
is that it must avoid even giving the appearance of being disrespect-
ful toward “Mother HBCU” by taking away money that she might
not be legally entitled to without articulating a compelling moral
justification.
Glen Ford of Black Agenda Radio strongly recommends that
President Obama be offered a short refresher course on the history
that created the conditions at HBCUs that now require direct fed-
eral aid to help correct.172 Since blacks were more or less intention-
ally shut out of higher education for most of their history in the
United States President Obama should give HBCUs the $85 million
dollars.173 Ford commented on the fact that those colleges at-
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id.
170 Watkins, supra note 165.
171 Pope, supra note 153.
172 Glen Ford, First Black President Cuts Funds for Black Higher Education, BLACK-
AGENDAREPORT.COM, May 13, 2009, http://blackagendareport.com/?q=content/first-
black-president-cuts-funds-black-higher-education.
173 Id.
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tended by large numbers of Hispanic students will have their
budget increased with direct federal aid from $93 million to $98
million.174 According to Ford, Native American higher education
receives the “Black treatment” because the Obama budget pro-
poses a decrease in federal funding to their schools.175 “The
Obama administration’s callous disregard for Black colleges is even
more curious, considering the [P]resident’s constant quest for ar-
eas of bipartisan consensus. Support for Black higher education is
one of the rare issues around which southern white Republicans
and members of the Congressional Black Caucus often find com-
mon ground.”176
Roger Caldwell has characterized the Obama administration’s
choice to reduce $85 million from HBCUs as insensitive because it
will compel HBCUs to increase tuition and expenses.177 Caldwell
calls for “an organized national protest and challenge from the Af-
rican American leadership and community to express their displea-
sure and outrage with this decision. Based on the present
economic conditions in the country, this $85 million program
should have been increased, instead of being cut.”178 President
Obama’s Assistant Secretary of Education Carmel Martin said,
“[t]he administration is definitely committed to strengthening
HBCUs and other colleges and universities that serve minority
populations.”179 Caldwell takes the position that Assistant Secretary
Martin’s statement creates a misleading impression that Obama’s
administration is increasing the federal dollars supporting
HBCUs.180 Because the Obama administration is reducing funding
to HBCUs “there should be a movement to write the senators and
congress people and demand a reinstatement of the $85 million
program to HBCU schools and students. If Bush could find $85
million to help HBCUs, then I am certain that Obama can find $85
million to continue the program,” said Caldwell.181
It is not a surprise that some black leaders in higher education
are vigorously opposed to either reduced or unequal funding to
HBCUs because they may share the perception that HBCUs are
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Roger Caldwell, Obama Cuts Millions From HBCUs, Shameful!, WEST ORLANDO
NEWS, May 27, 2009, available at http://westorlandonews.com/2009/05/27/obama-
cuts-millions-from-hbcus-shameful.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
30 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1
inherently unequal and inferior, a perception that can only be
remedied by either enhanced or equal funding.182 Those who be-
lieve that equal funding and voluntary race-neutral admission
polices among HBCUs and PWIs are the most effective way to
achieve diversity criticize the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Fordice
that the Constitution does not compel Mississippi to remedy fund-
ing disparities between its historically black colleges and its histori-
cally white colleges.183 Although it is conceded that the Fordice
Court does not require either the state or federal government to
correct funding disparities between HBCUs and PWIs, the wise
public policy implemented in Missouri demonstrates how enhance-
ment money to equalize HBCUs can promote reverse racial
diversity.
Voluntary freedom of choice has proved itself to be an effec-
tive tool for promoting diversity and overcoming racial imbalances
at historically black colleges where equal funding and enhance-
ments have been provided. Dr. Charles J. McClain, Commissioner
of the Department of Higher Education for the State of Missouri,
said that the Fordice ruling would not have an affect on his state.184
Dr. McClain said that the state’s two historically black colleges “re-
ceive more general revenue than similar institutions in the State.
McClain noted that Lincoln University, a historically black univer-
sity, has more white students than black students who attend the
institution.”185 Lincoln University has transformed into a nondis-
criminatory reverse diversity university where white students are
now in the majority through freedom of choice, enhancement
money and equal funding. The equal funding and enhancement
money provided to Lincoln University did not produce increased
racial isolation for blacks; instead it resulted in even more reverse
diversity. The funding at Lincoln preserved the traditional identity
of an HBCU while promoting educational diversity for students at-
tending Lincoln as a reverse diversity enclave of promising intellec-
tuals. Experience teaches us that intentional state action to
182 See L. Darnell Weeden, Statutory and Equal Protection Remedies to Save Historically
Black Colleges from the Effects of Invidious Desegregation, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 41, 50
(1992).
183  Id.; Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J. concurring) (agreeing with the majority’s
position that the Constitution did not require Mississippi to remedy funding dispari-
ties between its HBCUs and PWIs).
184 Diana Carter, Former Adams States Take Cautious Attitude Toward Fordice Decision,
BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 22, 1992, at 18; see, e.g., Geier v. Alexander (Geier
II), 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986); Geier v. Univ. of Tenn. (Geier I), 597 F.2d 1056 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
185 Carter, supra note 184, at 18.
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enhance and equally fund historically black Lincoln University is a
substantial factor in making it an appealing place to learn for all
students while at the same time advancing diversity. The experi-
ence at Lincoln University demonstrates that HBCUs are not inher-
ently non-diverse. The policy makers who want to close HBCUs
because they remain predominantly black should replicate Lin-
coln’s example rather than simply advocating for the closure of
HBCUs that were never given a chance to compete on equal
grounds.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and others seeking to impact education as a civil
rights policy must recognize the decisive role the Executive Branch
of the federal government has played in determining the scope
and direction of racial integration and race-neutral diversity in
higher education.186 In particular, Professor Lia Epperson scruti-
nizes the very commanding role of the United States Department
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights in influencing the treatment
of the Supreme Court’s opinions regarding racial diversity in pub-
lic education in both Brown and Grutter.187 Although the Obama
administration has the discretion to decide whether it will support
reverse diversity or other-race integration at HBCUs, any White
House failure to support HBCUs as transforming diversity institu-
tions should be challenged by the proper exercise of congressional
authority.188 Notwithstanding the power of Congress in establish-
ing educational policy on issues of diversity, Epperson appropri-
ately suggests that the congressional role does not reduce the very
strong role the Executive Branch plays in determining the course
of racial diversity in public higher education at either a PWI or an
HBCU.189
The Obama administration should follow Congress’ lead in
providing additional money to support HBCUs. Congress under-
stands it is not promoting a racially exclusive public funded higher
education enclave for blacks only. When Congress supports ex-
panding funding to maintain HBCUs, Congress knows that it is
making an investment to recast HBCUs from victims of Jim Crow
philosophy of separate but truly unequal to defenders of diversity
186 Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining The Role Of The Executive Branch In
Determining The Meaning And Scope Of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008).
187 Id.
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advancing socioeconomic integration. When the Obama White
House takes a leading role in providing additional federal dollars
to make HBCUs more attractive to all students regardless of race
and in the name of socioeconomic integration it is promoting di-
versity subject to rational basis review by the courts. A significant
advantage of advancing socioeconomic integration at both HBCUs
and PWIs that is truly not a proxy for race is being subject to ra-
tional basis review. Governmental policies that fail to provide ei-
ther equal or enhanced funding to HBCUs in order to transform
them into nontraditional diversity schools are most unfortunate.
Missouri’s Lincoln University has become so attractive and strong
with enhanced funding and educational goals that white students
attend in great enough numbers to have transformed Lincoln from
a traditional HBCU into a reverse diversity HBCU.190 Although the
Lincoln example may not work for every institution, I do not think
a single public HBCU should be closed until a state has made every
reasonable effort to replicate Lincoln’s reverse diversity plan.
190 Carter, supra note 184, at 18.
